SINON

OR

THE FUTURE OF POLITICS

E. A. MOWRER

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TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW

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OR

The Future of Politics

BY

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Author of *This American World*

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" Sinon, son of Aesimus, or according to Vergil, of Sisyphus . . . allowed himself to be taken prisoner by the Trojans and then persuaded them to admit into their city a wooden horse filled with armed men, which the Greeks had constructed. The Trojans believed the deceiver and dragged the horse into the city ; whereupon Sinon in the dead of night let the Greeks out of the horse, who thus took Troy."

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SINON

OR

THE FUTURE OF POLITICS

CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF POLITICS

THE SCIENCE OF POLITICS

". . . the tendencies of human nature are the permanent basis of study which gives to the subject called Political Science whatever scientific quality it possesses."—JAMES BRYCE, *Modern Democracies*.

ALL men are born politicians: that is, born into a relentlessly political society and equipped with a political instinct that only in rare individual cases is repressed or surpassed. All human societies are political in essence, whatever their ostensible purposes or specific origin. Moreover, the political instinct is not only ubiquitous to historical mankind, but is apparently shared with other socially minded creatures. When the black bears in Yellowstone National Park retreat precipitously from their garbage banquets at the first whiff of an approaching grizzly, they seem to be mimicking the one-time conduct of the "lower orders" of human beings.

The behaviour of such creatures as white ants seems intelligible only on the assumption of a political genius less flexible, but more highly developed than anything human beings can boast. We may, however, salve our irritated vanity by the thought that man is at least the highest of the political *mammals*, with which, as a class, he apparently shares a fundamental "conditioned reflex."

Professor Ivan Petrovich Pavlov has shown that dogs are provided with a "reflex against boundaries set to their freedom"; he believes that "all the remaining nervous functions of the animal organism are based upon" such fundamental reflexes.[1] His experiments, however incomplete, are of value to my basic thesis that the political instinct in men is so deeply grounded as to be relatively permanent.

Now, and for a long period of years to come, politics will continue to shower benefits and sow dismay among us. For they affect nearly every branch of our lives. The weight of the taxes, the quality and price of the food we eat, the degree of justice we obtain, our personal security in time of peace and the number and destructiveness of our wars, the range of our personal freedom—these and a thousand other vital matters are politically influenced or determined. The adult human being who ignores or neglects politics does so at the risk of bearing all

those burdens which are transferable from one human being to another.

This situation is a permanent one. Government " of, by and for " communists, engineers or industrialists will, in essence, remain just as " political " as that of kings, prætorians or politicians. A truly non-political society is incompatible with what we know of ourselves.

For society of any type, even restricted to the single family, limits activities in some directions while at the same time releasing them in others. So soon as human beings become conscious of themselves as individuals, their several aims must limit one another and the Pavlovian " reflex against boundaries " comes into play. This reflex may be considered identical with a positive Will To Power ; not necessarily to power for its own sake, but to power in order to enjoy its privileges. An absolute Will To Power, in the Nietzschean sense, is, like the corresponding " will to be ruled," somewhat rare. But the Will To *Sufficient* Power is practically universal, and is believed by investigators like Adler to be fundamental in human psychology ; whether it turn out to be a form of the creative Eros or of what Freud calls the " urge to die " (Todestrieb) does not affect this argument. From the clash of individual wills, some sort of conflict ensues inevitably, and you have politics. According to the philosopher Hobbes, happiness

itself is " a perpetual and ceaseless desire for power after power that ceaseth only in death."[2]

For without power, no personal or social aims, whether good or evil, are likely of achievement. To the few " born rulers," power yields the pleasure of the Roman centurion in simply being able to order people about. To everyone political power can and usually does mean additional food, comfort, luxury, honours and sexual gratification, and a marvellously enlarged and satisfying field for " self determination." Though it increases the number of our enemies, it fortifies us sturdily against them. It allows us better to indulge our socially creative talents, feed our every ambition, satisfy a greater share of our curiosity. It enables us to carry out our pet reforms for the betterment of the group or nation. It diminishes the inevitable risk of the delightful attempt to impose our way of life, ideals and beliefs on others; in short, to taste all the pleasures which the increase of *meum* over *tuum* can give.

There are indeed—and fortunately—certain fields where political power is ultimately baffled. Pluto may carry off Proserpine, but he cannot force her to love him or his dark abode, or to bear him the type of son he desires. No amount of political pressure can coerce an intelligent astronomer into believing an absurd Theory of Creation.

For a long time, perhaps always, the human race has occasionally produced an exceptional type of being intent chiefly on reaching a condition of internal freedom and therefore unwilling either to dominate other men or to be controlled by them. Persons of this type, artists or philosophers, do indeed seek power, but power over themselves, and thereby point the way to a greater future non-political society. It is clear that a society which cherished freedom or knowledge or art or saintliness above comfort and wealth and power, might for a time maintain an amazing indifference to mere politics. But unless it were world-embracing or isolated, it would end, if it did not begin, by rendering homage to Cæsar. In the long run, its knowledge and its art, if not its saintliness, would suffer dispersion. Not to mention the fact that there exists no record of any such society. For in order to be, it presupposes a fundamental change in human nature; however attractive as a goal, such a development lies beyond the realm of anything that seeks to pass for science in our era.

Political study can, however, claim attention as a branch of science only if it build upon elements common to all recorded experiences of a political type. In point of fact, every political situation does contain two constants, stout enough to bear the weight of general conclusions. These constants are

(1) *an individual and collective instinct for dominion over others;*
(2) *the means or forces whereby such dominion can be sought, consisting of (a) a force of mind; (b) a force of bodies; and (c) a force of wealth or property.*

Politics, therefore, is simply *the struggle resulting from the efforts of each human being to induce, persuade or constrain his fellows to do his will, and conversely, not to be induced, persuaded or constrained into doing theirs.*[3]

Each person, in addition to a Will To Power, possesses from childhood until death a force of mind with which to think, know and persuade ; a force of body with which to act, to attract and to constrain the bodies of others ; and a force of wealth (money, lands, bonds and shares, bodies of other persons, lucrative jobs, etc.) with which to extend, aid and increase the other forces. " Every man or woman more or less unconsciously uses these three forces . . . to increase them and to make them prevail over the opposing forces of other men and women—to obtain dominion over them—to live more securely —to satisfy his or her desires—whether good or bad."[4]

These forces are inherent in the world, and there are no others conceivable. Moreover, no case can be cited where the weight of any single one of them has been successfully eliminated from political struggle. " If the

elements are analysed by which a government . . . as much after civil war as after an election . . . reaches the hands of those persons who attain to government, it will be perceived that they, at the moment, comprise within themselves the greatest collective force of minds, honestly or dishonestly directive, of bodies disciplined and actively supporting, of financial means openly or covertly used," and that "they can, by armed violence of law, judges and soldiers . . . dominate and impose themselves as governors over all other persons . . . who must submit and be governed until they are able to acquire greater force and impose themselves in turn as new rulers."[5]

Established Government is the accompaniment. In theory, of course, political struggle could take place between individuals or closely united family groups without a superior principal or State. But so soon as a larger group of individuals comes to be, its inner relationship takes the form of dominion by some over others, which means the existence of Government.

The State is this dominion. On the basis of power alone, the rulers constitute Authority, and establish a certain "order," with division of the members of society on a scale of graduated rights and duties. *Might* in the threefold sense makes—not *Right* (which is an ethical conception varying from people to people, individual to individual and

epoch to epoch), but *Law*, which is therefore the indispensable support of the State. Justice is the rigorous enforcement of existing law,[6] injustice its lack of enforcement or lax enforcement.

The aim of the State *as such* is, like that of the individuals who compose it, the maintenance and increase of power, whether through numbers, territories, wealth or influence. Therefore "the rule is that all States all the time are trying to expand and either succeeding and becoming empires, or failing and becoming subject, or maintaining a precarious balance of power."[7]

Within the State, the dominion of a hierarchy is inevitable. The most masterful exercise the greatest authority—they enjoy, that is, great rights and have small duties; the less masterful exercise less power, with fewer rights and more duties.

Inevitably, from these scientific conclusions many persons will dissent. Government, they will urge, is founded not on force, but on reason; or on the "consent of the governed;" or on a "social contract" or on human equality; or on a Constitution; or on the Divine Right of kings or of numerical majorities; or on the Ten Commandments. In answer it is sufficient to point out that such persons have not suppressed the police and opened the prisons, nor in any respect done away with the symbols of the multiple dominion of some over others which

alone can guarantee government. Equality is a conception brought over from ethics or mathematics, where it means something, into politics, where it lacks genuine content.

Some further explanation is, however, necessary. Such an hierarchical organization based on superior force does indeed create and sustain the State, but under all but the most favourable circumstances it remains *despotic*, that is, arbitrary ; it fails to take account of the potential strength possessed by the indifferent masses, whose employment in struggle might have changed the outcome. The community, therefore, divides into three groups, (*a*) the dominating group, (*b*) the beaten group, and (*c*) the mass of those who took no active part. But this mass, however docile, ignorant and undeveloped, wields potentially considerable might ; by uniting with the beaten group of aspiring rulers it could perhaps turn the tables on the rulers and through a new conflict, by blows or ballots, oust them from their multiple dominion. To prevent such a procedure, the despotically ruling group become more or less *tyrannical*. The minds and bodies of the mass are deliberately disarmed, enslaved, deformed, given arduous duties, and next to no rights, in order to forestall a possible tendency to rebel. Religion, science, patriotism, morals, are forced into service to explain and justify the rule of the rulers, while dissenting

thought and speech are so far as possible suppressed. This is *tyranny*.

Usually the mass of the ruled—the people—submits, but under sufficient vexation it can be aroused to the point of using its latent forces actively, in a graduated process of resistance, ranging from grumbling and petitions to violent insurrection.

Despotism is therefore a condition of questionable internal Authority, and is the only sufficient cause of successful revolution. For had the overturned rulers possessed that completely superior power implicit in their claim to govern, they could have resisted insurrection from whatever source. If their government had not been despotic, its weakness would have been apparent and it would peacefully have given place to a stronger rule.

International authority is, however, permanently deficient so long as one "sovereign" State or group of States is not stronger than all the others together. This deficient external authority is the political cause of war, the second source of disorder, for if there can be no rights and duties where there is no recognized dominion, it follows that between "sovereign" States no relations are legal: what treaties or agreements they may make, do not constitute true contracts.

For the relations between sovereign equals, however mutually tolerant or

friendly, are anarchical. In the non-State of anarchy violence cannot be forestalled and self-protection constrains all to arm. In the absence of law, each must guarantee his security and liberty as best he can. "Sovereign" nations cannot disarm without risking destruction, and *war is the normal condition between them*, interrupted by brief periods of insecure peace guaranteed by scraps of paper, general exhaustion and the "common sense of mankind."[8] War is national Will to Power in international anarchy, and in time results in national exhaustion, conquest from without, or both.

The much-sought causes for the downfall of States can be only two: insurrection from within as the result of despotic government; conquest from without as the inevitable outcome of international anarchy.

So much for the scientific skeleton of politics. It may be possible to imagine States in which political activity would take a somewhat different form than that depicted here, but there are no credible records of any such groups.

Humanity is, however, so complicated, the single mind so stocked with (often contradictory) tendencies, that almost no one has had the wish or the capacity to sever the subjective links that bind politics to ethics and the need for spiritual reassurance.

Therefore Political Science has been and still is largely distorted or fanciful.

For though even the most holy-minded governments seemed in practice founded on crude dominion and their first aims the obtaining and preserving of power, the human conscience demanded that in some way Morality or Divine Justice or Natural Law be realized therein. Political theory had to choose between squaring with the observed facts or satisfying the ethical conscience of the time. It was more comforting to defer to the ethical conscience.

A great exception was Dante Alighieri when he wrote in the *De Monarchia: "Et iam manifestum est quod Romanus Populus per duellum adquisivit : ergo, de jure adquisivit."** For although Marcello Ficino in the fifteenth century translated *jure* as *ragione* (*reason* or *right*) Dante's whole argument points to the creation of a universal, *i.e., entirely legal* State, as the sole remedy against war, and therefore I take it that by *jure* he meant, not moral Right, but simply human Law.

Machiavelli also followed experience, and for his pains became popularly identified by later generations with Satan. For his age, though amazingly free of prejudice, leaned toward æsthetic standards, and the Floren-

* "And therefore it is clear that the Roman People acquired (dominion) by arms: therefore acquired it legally."

tine tried to make an artistic imperative out of a mere practice. (" *Se Francia adunque con le sue forze poteva assaltare Napoli, doveva farlo . . .* ").* [9] The result was that " the splendid blond beasts who practised the maxims of Machiavelli shuddered at the scribe who merely stated them."[10]

Another great Christian, Pascal, had moments of keen political insight, in one of which he remarked : " *La justice est ce qui est établi ; et ainsi toutes nos lois établies seront nécessairement tenues pour justes sans être examinées, puisqu'elles sont établies.*"†[11] At other moments, however, he seems to have lost sight of this point in admiration of the glory of Divine Justice.

The German school of thinkers that followed Hegel tried to carry on the science where Machiavelli had left it by the introduction of Kant's categorical imperative. Like Locke, Hegel founded political authority upon reason, but identified reason with the facts, namely with history. Which begs the real question as to whether Might or Theory makes Law. Later Germans of this school decided for Might, but went astray in so far as they identified might with

* " If therefore the French forces could (successfully) assault Naples, they ought to have done so."

† " Justice is that which is established ; and thus all our established laws will necessarily be considered just without examination, since they are established."

physical force alone (never more than transiently supreme) and laid themselves open to facile refutation. They quite properly noted that so long as States remain "sovereign" they have, in case of dispute, "no recourse but retaliation."[12] This is sound logic. But such frank utterance in the face of current ethical propaganda aided Germany in losing the World War.

For man is a civilizing animal and the State, however morally unsatisfactory in origin and essence, offers that relative security and freedom essential to civilization. In the non-State of anarchy, complete theoretical liberty for everyone results—human nature remaining constant—in next to no liberty for anyone. Order of some sort is so valuable that the ruled habitually put up with considerable discomfort, not only from laziness and fear, but rather than risk anarchy through revolt; even the rulers often overlook violation of their laws in preference to the disorder resulting from an attempt to enforce unpopular statutes. The State-conferred benefits are indeed so obvious that political ambition runs no further than a wish to substitute one's own —therefore a "better"—State for the actual one. Even when a sporadic preference for anarchy becomes temporarily realized, it results regularly in the speedy emergence of a new State.

The human need for a State does not,

however, mean that civilization is the State's aim or purpose, though it may be the latter's religious or philosophical justification. The aim of the State is that of all erstwhile rulers, namely their own dominion. Through this dominion the State is created: a situation is thinkable in which practically everything that we call civilization, outside of a certain order, could be combated by the rulers without destroying the State. For the "natural inclination whereby all men desire social life and fellowship"—as Richard Hooker called it—often fails, as among many fishes, to produce a State, even though the State be unthinkable without some degree of gregariousness. At most, this human gregariousness is politically important only as an element in Consensus, whose understanding belongs not to the science but to the art of politics.

THE ART OF POLITICS

The Will to Power and the individual and collective forces of mind, of body and of wealth are the lasting skeleton of politics. Or more accurately expressed, they are the highest common denominator of all political situations, the only constants among a host of variables. But it is precisely in these variables that the chief interest and importance of politics are found to lie. Merely to understand the large outlines is satisfactory to but few. Most persons who give any

thought to the subject wish to be equipped with vision for the specific situation. Now " really " to see deep into a concrete political picture does require something more than scientific principles, for what one might call the " normal play " of the three forces is an abstraction. In reality these forces are being exercised by individual entities with complicated and variable minds against a specific background of time and place. Understanding of actual politics is therefore possible only to the same extent and by the same means that we comprehend " human nature." For every political situation is like a human being, unique in time and space, non-recurrent, ultimately unthinkable in terms of anything but itself. Man, with all his egocentrism, is infinitely more than an animate Will to Power. A thousand beliefs, feelings, whims, ideals, allegiances sway him : he is capable of mercy ; can renounce the fruits of power for a girl or a god. Habitually imperious, he often prefers indolent obedience to the excessive irksomeness of political responsibility. Each human being is a world—*the* world !—of contradictory elements which upholster his ego. And however large a political society may be, not the least characteristic of the humblest of individuals but may conceivably become politically relevant. Collectively considered, such characteristics constitute political reality.

Take the example of what is called Consensus. "No Government," writes the deposed sovereign in Guglielmo Ferrero's post-war lament, "can face trial before the human reason without being convicted of usurpation."[13] Naturally not, for Government, freed from humbug, is essentially usurpation. Human inequality is so great that the support of the numerical majority is rarely necessary to dominion. All States, like the "Penguin democracy" of Anatole France, have been ruled by an oligarchy. That violence is so seldom required is due to the existence and cultivation of Consensus —the tolerance of the rulers by those receiving the smaller benefit of rule. Some Consensus is unconscious: no legal basis, however stable, could guarantee what we call civilized society if most of us did not instinctively practise the same conventional morality and conduct.

Many people, perhaps the majority, habitually uphold the *de facto* guardians of the State *as such*, since civilization under misrule seems preferable to civil war and despots rarely last long.

Equally general is Consensus of the emotional group-type which focuses in patriotism. Though the fundamental interest of each human being is itself, historically family or hive interests seem to have developed early and show no sign of disappearing. Group solidarity is natural and

indispensable to man. Under present historical conditions the most magnetic of such groups is the nation. In the bewildering stream of existence the average individual holds fast to two points—" the existence of his soul and the existence of the city (country, nation) he loves."[14] The glory of the group is the triumph of the individual. But the group, from the beginning, was totemistic. Athene, for instance, was not only the protectress of Athens, she was Athens. Even to-day, whenever the nation seems threatened, the group god is felt to be the nearest of divinities. For the nation is the protector of tradition and the cultural patrimony.

Therefore " it is not the process of civilization in general which States (and peoples) admire. It is the process of civilization by themselves."[15] For every people is convinced of its own essential rightness. And it bulwarks this conviction on whatever religion it possesses.

According to the incidents of the prevailing religion, political forms vary somewhat and political practice even more. The powers of a group are singularly augmented by the possession of moral or religious certitude. Natural courage may be amazingly reinforced by the belief that one's cause is worth the sacrifice of life, or by belief in a Heaven of brave warriors, or by utter despair, or even by rum and cocaine,

just as it may be diminished by the feeling that the "gods are against one." The very "Will to Power," essentially the dynamo of individualized life, may vary surprisingly in intensity. Though it never, even in the Orient, entirely disappears, it may, under the influence of religious or historical disillusions, disruptive rationalism or physical distress, so contract as to suffice no longer for the protection of the State. The individuals cease to propagate the species or fall subject to some less agnostic folk.

Even without the *Religionssoziologie* of Max Weber, it would be clear that political life in a society of Jains or Quakers must differ from that among Aztecs or the white conquerors of Black Africa. Max Weber believes that the Hindu religion has prevented the Indians from developing into a modern nation. This is the more striking because—contrary to the opinion in the Occident—Indian political theory down the ages shows a surprising parallelism with that of the Occident.[16]

Sometimes religious feeling runs counter to national development, as until recently among the Moslems. But it was the nature of Mohammedanism that it could really be put into practice by its adherents.

Christianity, on the other hand, is so essentially idealistic, that, if carried out essentially—"love thy neighbour as thyself"—it would eliminate politics and the

State altogether. It has never been essentially practised. The Christians forgot the non-Christian neighbour, but remembered all too well what was due to "Cæsar." Therefore, from the time of Augustine, Christianity in most of its forms has made for increased Consensus. At the same time it must be admitted that lip service to Christian ethics has, in the long run, tempered the harshness of rule. On the whole, however, religions have been steadily interpreted in favour of the powerful, and perhaps this was fortunate for civilization.

For Consensus is immensely valuable. Though Government by pure force is still a practical possibility, if the seats of the mighty are to prove comfortable and civilization to persist, the State as such must receive a large amount of disinterested adherence from the mass of the ruled.

Were Consensus to become thoroughly intelligent, namely in a scientific State where all the citizens took an active part in politics, the possibilities of misrule would be so small that civil war could hardly occur. Such a State is still a Utopia. "The differences between contemporary States," writes Pareto, "lie principally in the proportions between (physical force) and Consensus . . . and in the ways the force is used and the Consensus obtained."[17]

For the Art of Politics unfounded beliefs are as important as true ones. Rarely has

there been a more transparent myth than National Sovereignty. No State is truly sovereign whose power does not exceed that of all the others combined, yet this conceded right of the single government to do what it thinks fit not only continues to vitiate contemporary notions of "international law" but like a complacent jellyfish, blocks the pathway to further political and economic fusion.

Equally important is the group standard of living, for it reacts immediately upon the attitude toward wealth and the extension of territory. Nearly anyone will fight rather than starve, but the precise point is determined individually. Dominion for dominion's sake will shape one kind of State, whereas dominion for wealth would form another. Time and again the erstwhile rulers have preferred condominion with foreigners rather than a loss of their position and privileges to rival compatriots.

Scientific capacity is almost limitless in its political effects.

The importance of psychological elements must therefore be clear enough. Not less significant to a political situation are purely physical factors such as topography, harbours, distribution of water and natural resources, available tools, etc. It is conceivable that in a little country consisting of a plain and one mountain, the few holders of the mountain might, by this fact alone, be

able to impose their will on the many others. The same would be true of the possessors of the only fertile lands or the source of drinking water. In Morocco, before the French rule, the holders of the high places for thousands of years terrorized the lowlands. Struggles for the oases and salt supplies long constituted a common cause of desert warfare.

For descriptive purposes we may lump all non-political factors together and classify them as the Psychological Background and the Physical Frame of politics. Yet such a description is inevitably unscientific. Every concrete political situation, however seemingly transparent, can be grasped only by a process similar to artistic perception. On this account the Art of Politics is as ancient and highly developed as Political Science is narrow and new.

How, in a given situation, to become sovereign or to extend a merely partial dominion ; how to fill one's pockets from the common treasury or one's harem from the neighbour's gynœceum ; how to stage elections at the right moment and see that they fall out as desired—or avoid them altogether ; how to confuse the ignorant by specious oratory, bold misstatement, misleading nomenclature, emotional and moral appeal to native prejudice ; how to invoke public morality and accepted religion ; how to establish political parties and party machin-

ery; the most effective way of sexual and personal intrigue, of giving and receiving bribes, of wheedling despots and flattering mobs, of "cooking" and misinterpreting statistics—in a word, of making the most for one's own political purposes of all the available elements inherent in a situation—this has never been hidden from the daring and the astute. But such practice is learned only by instinct and experience, and reason helps little. Success presupposes native talents and a highly developed intuitive technique. The Art of Politics has certainly never been codified, nor can it be successfully learned by people lacking in "political sense," which is, in the last analysis, merely the requisite insight into human nature in a unique situation and the unhampered feeling of how best to exploit it.

Recent years have witnessed a determined attempt to widen the basis of political science. Although its essential success is doubtful, certain interesting facts have been stressed. Perhaps the most important is the discovery, I believe by the late Vilfredo Pareto, that whatever the so-called form of government, in practice all States are administered by an inner circle of privileged persons, that is, by an oligarchy. This is as exact of a democratic republic as of the most despotic monarchy. The reason is simply practical necessity, based on the fact that

close co-operation is limited by human capacity to a small number. It does not mean that "substantially" there is no difference between democracy and a despotic State. For whereas in a democracy the approximate power of the rulers is frequently tested by public election, the power of despots is necessarily a matter of conjecture. On this account the history of despotism is one long account of insurrection.

At some point political investigation leads inevitably to the study of psychology. The doctrines of the psychoanalysts are particularly stimulating to political conjecture. But until these doctrines have been more thoroughly tested, Political Science will do well to content itself with bare but essential principles that stand the test of general application.

A small but reliable science, a sharp, wide-roaming but not always trustworthy instinct, some political experience—these, and not ethical ideals, programmes, past beliefs, good or bad intentions, personal hopes or preferences, theological assumptions, desire for reform—must be the instruments of anything that wishes to pass for serious political investigation in our time.

CHAPTER II

Contemporary Political Movements

Within the psychological background of contemporary politics are five ideas whose influence is predominant. No one of them can, under existing conditions, entirely disappear, or yet be fully realized. Among themselves they are in sharp opposition and the near future depends on which of them succeeds in gaining the upper hand. These ideas are (1) Human Equality; (2) Nationalism; (3) Individualism; (4) Efficiency; and (5) Internationalism.

1. EQUALITY

Democracy means rule by the masses, but it is commonly applied to all States with nominal majority rule, regardless of remaining inequalities between individuals. Such democracy is, however, only a half-way stage in a grand process of levelling that finds its fullest expression in theoretical Communism. Along the way between what may be called mild liberalism and extreme Communism are many stations, and at each we find hosts of political adherents, each group proclaiming its location the "reasonable" end to the

levellers' line. But Communism is only a ruthlessly logical development of the first timid proclamations of human equality, and its partisans are making what is, at least in theory, the first attempt in history, literally to realize it.

Religion, envy, philosophy, illusion and pity were the fathers of the Equality Movement. The invention of firearms made it physically practicable and industrialism turned out to be the frame in which it could first be effectively tried.

Men habitually seek to ground their actions in the divine and to secure for their personal wishes a transcendent ethical sanction. Familiar as he is with the all too human side of the Vatican Conclave, the newly-elected Pope yet feels himself the chosen of God. From its very beginning the Equality Movement has drawn its water from a religious source, and in its extreme form of Communism has drunk up mysticism without stint. Official Christianity began by defending even anti-Christian despotism on the Divine Right theory (Augustine). But at the same time its belief in the equality of souls led it to support the notion of Natural Rights found in old Roman jurisprudence, and thus paved the way for the theoretical proclamation of popular sovereignty.[18] Even the despotic Middle Ages admitted that all persons possessed some Natural Rights, the denial

of which was iniquitous. This was the first step toward equality.

Once started the process could not stop. The early lay philosophers went over to the "people" and took with them their ally, "reason," as well as an omniscience based on familiarity with the divine.

God, it was announced, created all human beings free and equal. Therefore it is "just" that all have an equal share in government and the will of the majority rule. This "truth" was roughly embodied in the American Constitution and the Declaration of the Rights of Man.

This done, most of the "democrats" were satisfied, and many still are. But machine-driven industry was in its early period so cruel to the masses that many a good burgher began to wonder why political democracy brought such pitiful social results. The answer came that a few people possessed all the productive capital and therefore the power.

Now the State expected patriotism from all. Patriotism implies a stake in the community. No stake, no *patria*, no patriotism. It began to be whispered that no one ought to enjoy any more of the earth's goods than his fellows. And here the revolution began that still continues. For as Machiavelli knew, "Men forget the death of their father more quickly than the loss of their patrimony." Both sides began to organize.

Production increased, but so did the number of babies. Obviously if the weak were to be equal to the strong, the weak must get strong—viz., less numerous and better organized, and the strong must be shackled. For the key to equality was felt to be equal property for all.

The permanent equal division of productive property, however, seemed impossibly difficult. How much simpler to suppress the private ownership of productive property! This was immediately done—in words. Proudhon declared that property was theft. "Socialize the means of production," answered Karl Marx. "Let the workers of all countries unite, overthrow the owners, install communism and suppress the political frontiers."

The owners still laughed but not for very long. Equalitarianism under the names of Socialism and Communism was launched to stay launched. If its tenets went against human nature, then human nature must be made over.

By a special process of criticism, definition, Hegelian "logic," immense emotion, untiring energy and the utilization of the hypocrisy and stupidity of their opponents, the Socialists and Communists—separated in the important matter of tactics—have made tremendous gains. The Communists have, however, gone much further: they have done nothing less than transform

a political belief into a full-blown mystico-materialist religion. The early Liberals, with their "born free and equal" talk, promised a state they never seriously attempted to realize. By attempting to bring it about the Communists are proving themselves the only true democrats. Materialists as they are, they yet manage to believe in a natural right and an abstract justice. Why not, since their prophets have told them that the triumph of the proletariat is not only possible but historically inevitable? This promise gives them the burning certainty of Moslem conquerors, and for the rest of the world they reserve a truly Moslem alternative—conversion or extinction. But this draught of mysticism was capped by a second: in last analysis the Communists promise a world from which violence and greed will have completely disappeared! This mass conversion is to be brought about by a militant dictatorship ruling the non-communist mass for its own good until, through habit and education, the mass becomes communist; everyone begins voluntarily to do his best for equal return; hunger, rulers and policemen are no more and "the proletarian State . . . withers away."[19]

This apocalypse is really the kernel of Communism. Without it, there is little to induce modern workingmen to further a movement which, during a "transition period," that may last many generations,

excludes them from all freedom, even that of filling out a "useless ballot," in return for the privilege of living under dictators of their own class.

The real difficulty of supposing that the workers of the world will in some none too distant future manage to live together without a State is partially avoided by defining the State as "a special force for the suppression of a particular class" (Lenin).[20] This leaves ground for the permanence of a purely one-class police, army and rulers. But if the new Law and its prophets are to be taken literally, they must mean either that breeding and education will eliminate natural inequality among Communists, or that the stronger and wiser will eagerly submit to being ruled by the majority of their inferiors—a state one might define as the "Communism of Saints."

More than in the unwillingness of their opponents to deny equality as an ideal, or in the shrewdness of the Communists' criticism of existing conditions, the appeal of the movement lies in the promise of a Heaven on earth. In general, the drawing power of a political movement is in inverse ratio to its rational coherence. For while the rest of the world doubts, the Communists believe.

Since this doctrine was proclaimed it has not only conquered Russia but has brought about a definite re-grouping of all social and political matters on "international" class

lines. Perhaps the most striking fact of our day is the social pressure exerted on every individual to identify himself with one or the other of the militant classes, the "Capitalists" (bourgeois) or the "Proletarians." For the latter have proclaimed latent war on the former, and announce an intention of putting it into effect as soon as circumstances offer a reasonable chance of success.

So much for the extreme dogma of human Equality. Some of it is rubbish and some is poetry. But it draws. Not a modern country but is infected with some degree of class war. Except in the United States, where the Capitalists learned to pass the fruit basket before it was too late, the more interesting portion of the world's workers are Equalitarians. To-day's Conservatives, no longer proud of their wealth, admit a belief in "equality of opportunity." Nearly every intelligent person is compelled to take sides in what is known as the "social question." Everywhere the fundamental urge is similar: liberty in capsules, fraternity as a mystic dream, but equality in everything, here and now.

2. NATIONALISM

The nation, as a political term, is the *desired and recognized unity of the native and naturalized residents of a territory in a State.* Not common ancestry, language, history, culture or tradition is the determining factor, but the will to form a common State, on

condition this will be recognized by other Nations powerful enough to prevent its realization. In the absence of international recognition, there is a nationality but no nation.

Therefore the nation is as old as the State itself and inseparable from it.[21] There was an Athenian nation and a Trojan. There is to-day a Swiss nation and a Belgian and a Soviet Russian nation and a San Marinese nation. There nearly was a Confederate American nation. There is no Ukrainian or Indian nation or Jewish nation.

The will to form a State implies patriotism. He who refuses to support the State sets himself outside the nation. The politically indifferent are not " nationals " in the strict sense.

Under modern conditions patriotism of a decided type is the rule : this has not always been the case.

In itself, Nationalism is mostly the emotional correlative of political organization in nations. Yet the nation of the Nationalist is far more than a political reality. It includes his love for the language, tradition, memories, customs and (often) religion prevailing in the State to which he happens to belong. It is Athens plus Athene. This love for one's own essential possessions is easy to understand and share. It is like the love for one's family members. But just as some very noble families have raised

the family idea above the family as human beings, so the true Nationalist subordinates the existing political nation, that is, the specific human beings who affirm the State, to a mystical-emotional National Idea, a kind of spirit, visible in the State, the language, etc., but existing essentially as an unseen but ever so dearly felt deity. Like Communism, though less irrationally so—for it is easier to love oneself in one's country than to believe men can be trained to live without sanctions—Nationalism is a religion. In its tenets individuals become so many instruments at the service of the national deity, incarnate in the State, whose growth in territory and glory is, or ought to be, the supreme aim of the "Nationals."

Symptoms of Nationalism were apparent in France in the Middle Ages, and Francis Bacon was an early case in England. In the nineteenth century Nationalism swept the world like an epidemic. The dogmatic formulation of modern Nationalism seems to have been born of Hegel's resentment that Germany was unable to stand against Napoleon. His philosophy is too well known to need elucidation, especially as it lives on in the writings of a hundred modern Nationalists.[22] Inevitably Nationalism is more acute where a nationality was late in forming or long unrecognized. In some parts of the earth the first symptoms are to-day barely apparent; elsewhere "young"

nations are in the flush of fever ; the older States seem convalescent.

It would seem that in the West the apogee of Nationalism has been passed. For the growth of the nation in territory and glory implies willingness to make war. Only, war under modern conditions has become an ultra-costly and inglorious affair. Moreover, " national efficiency " at its highest seems to demand the abolition of political equality for the benefit of a hierarchy topped by some " world historical individual." Nationalist rulers tend to encourage the growth of population beyond the economic turning point, where the standard of living begins to fall. And finally, Nationalism destroys culture of any known type by subordinating the free play of individuality—the only source of culture—to the supposed national purpose.

Yet so long as international anarchy persists, modern states must remain more or less nationalistic.

3. INDIVIDUALISM

The belief in the individual as the ultimate value and measure of all things is, in the Orient, extremely old. In the Occident Socrates and the later Greek and Roman Philosophers upheld it and early Christianity was grounded on the importance of the individual soul, toned down by Church sovereignty in matters of conscience. There

can be no doubts that the modern world, for better or for worse, is almost exclusively the product of Individualism.

Now the essence of Individualism is the proclamation of the unique quality and ultimate value of every human being. Individualists believe that God and mankind are best served where individuals are allowed the maximum freedom compatible with society. The best government is the least government. The ultimate aim is anarchy —an anarchy of saints.[23]

Unfortunately, as the world grew more complex, this theory began to produce dire social and economic fruits, namely a monstrous competition in greed, economic tyranny and "supermanism." Even within the countries where Individualism was most deeply rooted a reaction set in, aided by the Church, the Equalitarians, the Nationalists and the Efficiency Fiends.

The Church saw its opportunity to offer to all those who might be called the "derelicts of Individualism"—human beings too weak to stand alone in spiritual matters—a "social faith."[24]

The Equalitarians, bent on stripping the individual of his claim to uniqueness and his free will, desire to believe man as he is the almost exclusive product of environment and therefore subject to any correction that seems desirable to the ruling mass. History, economics, literature, must be re-written to

demonstrate that not great individuals but obscure masses have really produced what is valuable in human achievement.

The Nationalists consider that Individualism wastes time in discussion and produces conscientious objectors. It hobbles the stride of the nation in its race toward "manifest destiny."

Efficiency Fiends simply note that States are easier to govern when competent rulers can ride rough-shod over the masses.

Now these four groups are, when they pull together, a powerful team. Aided by the real interlocking complexities of the world, they have managed to discredit Individualism as a philosophy and to restrict personal liberty. Yet there seems a biological trend towards greater and not less individuation, and Individualism—which means practical inequality, variety and personal freedom—tends to bob up in one place if suppressed in another. When laws and firearms reduced the weight of superior muscles, greater economic Individualism and power resulted.

4. EFFICIENCY

"Government is really getting out of the hands of the people, not in the sense that anybody is taking it away from them, but in the sense that with the rapid extension of its technical aspects, it is getting more and more difficult to comprehend and control."[25]

Human development has failed to keep step morally and intellectually with material accomplishment. At the same time, complexity has made blunders more costly and far-reaching. And finally, with the machine for a model, people expect an ever more frictionless functioning.

The price of efficiency is heavy, but few openly refuse it. For the sake of efficiency any number of men and women are prepared to scrap the treasured conquests of the past, democracy, leisure, beauty and personal liberty. The best government, they say, is a one-man government. Much of this craze is simple materialism: efficiency in this sense is synonymous with increased production of goods. But most contemporaries, even in the Far East, have become infected with the notion of doing the job well and as quickly as possible, whether or not it is worth doing. On this account the field of tolerated freedom shrinks and laziness becomes an ever more damnable sin. The conception of "applying engineering methods to society" progresses and no rulers can hope to survive who do not appear to further the mechanical ideal.

5. INTERNATIONALISM

Internationalism may be ethical or utilitarian.

Some people come to Internationalism as

they come to God—because they can find no resting place for ethical endeavour short of all mankind. Their aims are human brotherhood and the removal of nationalist yokes and blinkers.

There is another kind of Internationalism with a much more numerous group of followers. These seek some advantage for themselves or their descendants in world-wide order, legality and organization. Their guide is common sense.

Though they can be lumped under a common label, contemporary Internationalists are a motley lot, spiteful as rival theologians, disunited as to aims and methods. Some few desire a real super-State with adequate supreme powers. Others of Socialistic mind would like national States abolished or whittled down for the benefit of a kind of supreme Labour Board with just enough authority to guarantee good wages and nip off any renascent weeds of abolished Capitalism. Some again dream of a World Board of Trade, whose " business administration " should promote private profits and mechanical development unhindered by national frontiers or labour troubles. Others hope for any centralized authority with power enough to enable the " fit " to put a misgoverned and disorderly world to rights. In the meantime all but the Communists agree in envisaging the present League of Nations as a kind of international Fire

Brigade to put out war, and for this reason support it.

The Communist Internationale is a thing apart. For unlike the Socialists, the Communists take their "class war" literally. In last analysis they desire a classless international society, and in so far must be classed with the other Internationalists. But in the meantime—and this is all that counts at present—their aim is not international peace and a world State—for these aims to them would merely perpetuate the triumph of the Capitalistic system on a basis of "wage slavery"—but an alliance of the working classes in all States for the violent overthrow of all bourgeois governments. Whereas to the mere Socialist like Bertrand Russell, peace is more important than socializing the means of production (since without it there will soon be nothing but a bomb-pitted soil left to socialize), the Communists are prepared to risk everything for the triumph of their principles. It is hard to avoid the suspicion that to many Communist leaders, immediate vengeance by the "working" upon the "exploiting" classes is more important than any future society. The Third or Communist Internationale is therefore an "open conspiracy" of the "oppressed" (in so far as they can be induced to take part) under the leadership of a President, an Executive Committee, an unimportant International Commission

of Control, and a loosely organized World Congress whose rôle is largely limited to approving the decisions of the really powerful Executive Committee.

But its driving force seems more accidentally than substantially Internationalist. "Because Capitalism is a world-phenomenon, the revolution that is to secure its overthrow is necessarily a world-phenomenon also."[26] A military alliance, however wide-spreading, against a common enemy cannot be considered a part of another world-wide movement whose chief aims are immediate international organization and the preservation of world peace.

Theoretical Internationalism is historically at least as old as the great Oriental religions. Republican Rome was intensely Nationalist. But as the Best and Biggest of Jupiters gradually yielded to *Dea Roma* and the Genius of the ruling Emperor, it was seen that the National Idea, in the strict sense, had given way to an international interest in the promotion of peace, profits and efficiency. For to the Roman speculators in wheat, all grain-growing provinces, Italian or not, looked alike.

The early Church remained international for a considerable time, and eighteenth-century Europe was internationally minded —at the summit of society. Then Internationalism practically disappeared until revived in our time under the influence of a

globe-embracing technique, mass-producing machinery and a world war.

The first political result was the League of Nations, a hybrid organization grounded on concrete national interests, false assumptions, bad logic—and a universal fear of more war. Handicapped by its lack of universality and its organizers' failure to proportion representation to real power, it has been functioning rather feebly, with a tendency to improve. For it is becoming clear that international activities cannot really be dispensed with. Merely as a co-ordinator for non-political efforts, the League is so useful that were it to expire from external strangulation or internal dry-rot, a substitute would be created to take its place. And some international means for preserving the peace—as the signing of the Paris Peace Pact demonstrated—is gradually being recognized as indispensable if civilization is to be preserved at anything like its present level.

CHAPTER III

The Crisis of the Modern State

Despite increasing standardization, a map that could reveal the political minds of the earth's inhabitants would still be a brightly coloured sheet. Here are Empires—Great Britain, France, Russia, Japan, the United States—exercising unwelcome dominion over alien peoples. The first-named has recently burst into an alliance—the British Commonwealth of Nations—of virtually independent States. Here close together lie Germany and Italy, the one a parliamentary republic with an oligarchic psychology, the other a nominal kingdom actually ruled by an adventurous commoner in the name of his personal followers. The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics conceals under its name a Communist despotism whose rulers govern in the name of the enlightened workers of the world and a materialistic interpretation of history of which each of its important leaders is a living refutation. In Japan, modern industry and the international class struggle have developed within a framework of fanatical patriotism several thousand years

old. Hardly a modern State but is streaked with political paradox.

Yet as the world grows technically more capable, complicated and exigent, conflicts, long latent, become active, innocuous rivalries begin to fester, successful compromises break down. People are compelled almost unconsciously to make vital choice between rival ideas. This choice suggests some change in State form.

I. DEMOCRATIC STATES

Modern democratic States are alike in possessing a representative system of Government with nominal majority rule. Their ideal is a compromise between human equality, Nationalism, efficiency, Individualism and international aspiration. No one of these aims is allowed to dominate the others. Political equality is offset by economic difference, Individualism by a constantly increasing drive toward collective efficiency, Nationalism by the obvious benefits of international co-operation and the need to forestall war. On this account, these States can dispense with established religion—the only effective compensation for suppressed instincts—and even with a "hereditary enemy." Where periodically controlled by representative election, "compromise democracy" is on the whole the most effective system of government of modern times. For

it is closest to essential human nature, wherein each basic instinct struggles for a supremacy that, if achieved, would destroy the breed.

None the less, in the larger States, this theoretically satisfactory democracy is showing signs of wear. Critics of all types —and not all of them blindly fanatical—are arising to accuse, to threaten and to warn. So long as these voices demand only more real equality, or more Nationalism, or more individual freedom, or more international co-operation, their influence, despite the defection of a State like Italy, may prove stimulating rather than dangerous. The really damaging charge is that democracy is meeting the claim for efficiency of administration within and of policy without, only at the expense of its principles.

In my opinion, this accusation is correct, and large-scale democracy is breaking down.

Doubtless the reasons are many. But the chief is machine technique. As a tool, machinery has brought the entire globe within our grasp and made us responsible for it ; as a model of precision it encourages a demand for ever more competent administration, beneficial laws and effective foreign policy. This demand would require ever better popular discernment in the choice of legislators. Instead of which there is a growing preference for " wind bags " and

" glad handers." Without the leadership of the more competent, the masses are neither intellectually nor morally capable of maintaining contemporary civilization. But under the present system of representation, not even a parliament of geniuses would be equal to the task of legislating intelligently in all matters connected with anything so complicated as the British Empire. Some countries have simply become too big and their administration too complicated for any single body to tackle. Symptomatic are the number of bills which, under demagogic pressure, are regularly brought to die before the ruling bodies. In 1913 there were no less than 29,000 before the American House of Representatives and 9,000 before the Senate.

Without auxiliaries the legislators would be powerless. Even assisted by Press, radio, lobbies, party machines and an army of bureaucratic advisers, effective government on strictly democratic lines is, in large countries, impossible. Effective popular control has shrunk almost as fast as theoretical equality has grown, not so much owing to the power of Capitalism and its " vested interests," great though they be, under the pressure of necessity. The practice of sorting and burying bills in committees is undemocratic. The influence of lobbies is equally so and often corrupt as well. Party discipline and organization

make light of the popular will and prevent discussion of important issues. The executive usurps greater power. Where strict proportional representation exists, only the irresponsible activity of the bureaucracy saves the country from weltering in a goulash of small conflicting parties that can agree on nothing but the desire of keeping their respective jobs.

The Fascists are right in assuming that the efficiency and power of large centralized States require an equivalent sacrifice of individuality and democracy. Everywhere real government is slipping into the hands of a small group of orators, financiers and technicians. Personal liberty shrivels and standardized men to fit the standardized machines become the aim of the rulers. This is the parody of representative government as originally conceived.

For far-reaching equality with direct legislation is effective only in small groups, preferably with a homogeneous population. The little countries, Holland, Denmark, Switzerland, are doing well enough. But the larger the State and the higher the degree of efficiency demanded, the more pronounced is the oligarchic character becoming. The large State, even when democratic in theory, is compelled to hold to its efficiency and its might at the expense of its Equalitarian principles. When this situation becomes sufficiently obvious it is likely that the veils

will be dropped and the already powerful oligarchy emerge, openly to challenge popular government.

2. DESPOTIC STATES

Traditional despotism is moving steadily toward representative government of a western type and has ceased to be politically significant. But in Europe a new despotism has emerged as a reaction to parliamentary or constitutional government. Occurring in countries with low educational and living standards, backward industry, meagre civic training, this experimental dictatorship may from one point of view be no more than an attempt to catch up with more developed States by violent reform. In the two really important despotic countries, Russia and Italy, the present is said to be merely a chrysalis from which the now imprisoned worm will one day come butterflying into true freedom. The Bolshevik dictatorship is a " war measure " planned to last only until all Russians are convinced Communists, until government operations have become " simple functions anyone can understand "[27] and until the State—even the Proletarian State of to-day—" withers away." Italy's dictator hints at abdication so soon as the machinery and mentality can be created for a " national commonwealth " or Guild State apparently modelled on Gabriele D'Annunzio's unapplied constitution of Fiume. In the

meantime both groups of oligarchs pride themselves on increasing national efficiency and power.

Both despotisms are founded on a political religion. In Russia Mankind—on condition of joining the Communist movement—in Italy National Grandeur, are the object of a cult without which the régimes might prove untenable.

Soviet Russia is ruled by a small Communist oligarchy that verges on a personal dictatorship.

Thanks to emotional intensity, self-confidence and a steel discipline that recall those of the early Jesuits, the leaders have created the strongest and most logical party machine ever seen. This machine has installed partial Communism by force and declared latent permanent war on all non-Communist States. Within its territories, virtual economic equality (personal gratification) has been purchased at the price of complete political inequality, the subjection of the immense majority of non-communists, secret police tyranny, an inflexible super-bureaucracy, the abolition of personal liberty and a concentration of the entire *power* of wealth in the hands of the oligarchs.

The rulers live little better than the ruled. But without their willingness none can live at all. By controlling all the jobs within the single industrial system that is the State,

and by constraint over the only partly communized peasants, the leaders have created a degree of real inequality and personal uncertainty unique in the contemporary world. A few score rulers actually wield a power of wealth that the combined American trusts do not approximate—the power of life and death over a hundred and fifty millions—in the name of economic equality.

Equality is therefore a promise; individualism is excommunicate (and with it supernatural religion); efficiency is low but eagerly sought. The instinct of Nationalism has been deflected into a "latent war" against the world Capitalists—a fairly easy matter so long as Russia is the only Communist State. Internationalism is reserved for a distant future except as an attempt to bring about revolutions in Capitalistic States.

No wonder conjecture is rife among all those sceptical of Marxian determinism as to the future of such a system in such a country.

In the writer's opinion it is not likely to be overthrown from abroad. The country's vastness is a pneumatic cushion against aggression. The presence of militant Communist minorities and considerably larger bodies of sympathizers in most Capitalistic countries will act as a deterrent to such Governments as might like to overthrow Communism by force. The native military strength seems to be increasing.

Nor does the chance of successful overthrow from within seem very much greater. The Russian oligarchs are capable and ruthless. All conceivable domestic enemies have been coldly extirpated and the secret police span the land in invisible cobwebs of steel. Even the question of the living standard need not cause the rulers much distress. It was so low when they took over the country that some improvement was hard to prevent, and all such development is booked to their credit. On this account, the task—elsewhere almost superhuman—of deciding in advance every detail of economic production and distribution is marvellously lightened. Nothing short of complete economic breakdown could jar the rulers from their seats—and perhaps not that.

But if violent overthrow of all types be excluded, the question remains whether the Soviet dictatorship can last very long even if left at peace to carry out its revolutionary experiment. Communist dogma proclaims the certain triumph of the proletariat: the "oppressed church" of the early prophetic days has given place to the *ecclesia militans* of contemporary Russia, and this must surely be followed by the "triumphant church" of world-wide Communism—ultimately—as soon as, under the protection of the dictatorship, it has produced a superior, non-individual Mass Man, whose inner being is entirely social. The dictator's task is,

first, incendiary, which requires the maintenance of revolutionary fervour; second, biological—the breeding of a race that will inherit the characteristics acquired by this intensive education, or in other words the verification of the still dubious thesis of Lamarck. The present-day proletariat is however urged to covet bourgeois superfluity: it is safe to say that to breed totally social beings from greedy Individualists may take some time.

In the meanwhile, during a period of "permanent revolution," efficiency demands the education of the individual Bolshevik. And here, in my opinion, lies the inherent weakness of the dictatorship. So long as the despots rode roughshod over ignorant masses they might hope to maintain their rule indefinitely. But in the process of turning ignorant peasants and industrial slaves into intelligent, self-respecting Communists, they are likely to have raised a Frankenstein.

Education—however partisan—must tend to awaken individual opinion, if not ambition. In other words, as the number of convinced Communists increases, so will increase their demand for a real say in Russian affairs.

So long as the "war mentality" and the religious fanaticism last, this demand may, in the mass as among the oligarchs, be subdued by fear of weakening the Communist front. Despotism is the appropriate form of

government for purposes of war, where a quick resolute decision is more valuable than a sound one. But no people in the past has consented indefinitely to military discipline. Psychologically, it has never long proved possible to maintain human enthusiasm for anything at white heat. To-day there is but one crevice in the mental cocoon spun about the Russian people—foreign films. Yet mutilated, doctored and deformed as they are, these bourgeois movies surpass Communist projections in popularity. On the basis of such evidence of normal psychology, one may infer that the new generations of Russians, however deep their Communist faith, will be independent enough to exert increasing pressure for a widening of the despotism on something like democratic lines.

To refuse such a demand for more power would severely try the position of the oligarchs—I do not believe they would risk it. For it would mean a dangerous drop in industrial efficiency—if not worse. How could one expect obedience and co-operation from millions of convinced Communists who, despite their belief, were excluded from any real power—even from membership in the hand-picked, nominally ruling Party? The despotism would have to fade prematurely before the moment arrived for the State to "wither away." Something of a more popular type—universal representation

along Soviet lines—would replace the present narrow oligarchy. The despotism would have perished of its own success.

Further: until *Mass Man* walks the earth, the Soviet State is fundamentally subject to the same psychological limitations as other countries. If a fairly small country like Germany is too large to be governed efficiently under democracy, what must one infer of a giant like Russia, without common language or united historical tradition, where the functions of rule included the *a priori* planning of the entire economic system? Even under Capitalism, Soviet Russia is far too large to be governed democratically: under Communism, democratic administration would certainly falter. On this account, popularizing the régime might well have for its first consequence a huge decentralization extending even to division into a number of semi-independent States, united perhaps by their common Communism, but subject to Nationalistic emotion and internecine quarrels hardly distinguishable from those of their Capitalist rivals, and collectively less powerful than when despotically united. Capitalist Russia will, it seems, tend almost inevitably towards more democracy—and the consequences may be both unexpected and gigantic.

"All for the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against the State." So runs

the motto of Fascist Italy. By the State the Fascists mean their *Party*. The Party is the *Government*, the Government is the dictator or *Duce*. The *Duce* is Fascist Italy. "Nothing against the State" means no opposition to this or (presumably) to a future *Duce*.

The present Government of Italy is therefore a personal despotism nesting within the framework of a constitutional monarchy. The King may keep his ermine on condition of permanently relinquishing the sceptre.

The means used are those traditional to tyranny—censorship, legal and extra-legal police espionage, and violence. There is no equality, small political liberty and only one individual, the *Duce*. Internationalism, except in the form of loans from abroad, is a subject of laughter and contumely.[28] Fascism repudiates Internationalists, whether clerical, Communist or simply humane. Opposition, criticism or ridicule are tabu. But it tries intensely to educate the sub-Nationalist masses to patriotism. For its aim is high-power Nationalism on the basis of a "social harmony" between classes, groups and specific interests. True, the Fascists were able to fill the void of Parliamentary inanity and seize the power only thanks to an alliance with the frightened rich. But to-day the Party—with the State treasury at its disposal—maintains considerable independence of its former backers, whom it hyper-

bolically claims to have "saved from Bolshevism."

In many respects the aims of the régime and its international manners resemble those of pre-War Germany.

Under the appropriate leadership of the present *Duce*, inspired by syndicalist ideas, Soviet practice, ancient Roman rhetoric and mediæval tradition, Italy has come into its Nationalist phase of history, a phase the more feverish for its belated outbreak. A glorious past, preserved in daily verbiage, an unheroic near-present coupled with the pseudo-parliamentarism of Giovanni Giolitti—these produced a need for "over-compensation." And when in the late War Italy pulled itself together and in the conquest of the Bainsizza and the defence of the Piave manifested considerable character, all the long-suppressed desire for national glory sought an appropriate vessel and filled it to bursting. This vessel is Fascism. Under Fascism Italy is to equal—surpass—the older nations and prosper on old Roman lines, if need be at their expense. The aim is evident from the oft-heard syllogism: "Italy is too small for its present population; therefore it is the duty of all Italians to have more children." The *Duce* hopes to acquire territory and glory by threats; should his bluff be called, war or his humiliation would result.

Much that was said about the Soviet

oligarchy applies equally to Italy. As in Russia, the few capable individuals are superior to the entire passive mass in daring, energy, ruthlessness and intelligence. Yet the permanent weakness of despotism is that its inner strength cannot be measured. Education increases the number of those who must speedily be incorporated into the oligarchy if they are not to smash it. Fascism draws its chief strength from the rural masses and provincial smaller bourgeoisie, as well as from the pocketbook panic of the Capitalists. Yet efficiency in the modern age is largely a matter of industrial development. Developed industry requires highly educated technicians and workmen. Therefore the danger that too much efficiency will endanger the oligarchy.

Further uncertainties are the Monarchy and the Church. Whereas the Russian despots have carefully extirpated all forms of opposition, the Duce has been satisfied to cajole, intimidate and preserve the adherence of King and Pope. So far with fair success. But the doctrine of the social compromise whereby the interests of " three sovereigns " are to be swept into the interest of the State as conceived by one of them, is likely to cause permanent discontent.

On the other hand, so long as the Fascists can keep the confidence of the foreign money lords—largely a reflection of the attitude of the Italian plutocrats—they seem fairly safe

against successful insurrection. The people is not particularly servile, but it is sceptical, politically indolent, individually adverse to personal risk and comparatively easy to rule by violence.

So long as things go well. When they do not, criticism and mockery may become strong enough to smother any régime. Passive resistance would do the rest. The dangers to Fascism are two: an economic breakdown which could no longer be conjured away by an appeal to support Italian grain or Leghorn straw hats; and the very Nationalism that called the dictatorship into being. For the ultimate meaning of Nationalism is war.

It remains to test the military efficiency of a régime founded on the disenfranchising of the masses. That Italy has gradually become more patriotic and self-respecting there can be no doubt. Yet it is doubtful if the strength even of new Italy be ample for a successful bout with the older giants—or even to withstand strong economic pressure. Defeat in war would spell the doom of Fascism. Yet one wonders how long a blindfolded people nurtured on promises of military glory and increased territory will remain satisfied with words. For the increase of population encouraged by State and Church practically must, if successful, under such a government create an untenable situation.

At this point the *Duce* would be deserted by International Finance and it is likely peace would be maintained even at cost of the *Duce*.

The outlook for the permanence of despotism in Italy is therefore not very bright. Either the *Duce* gets on with the work of transforming the constitution and abdicates in favour of a Guild Democracy that might be a model to the world—for there is a universal trend in that direction; or as enthusiasm subsides the old Italian Adam asserts himself and Fascism yields to the pressure of popular scepticism and ridicule; or the system proves economically unsound and is driven out by world plutocracy; or Fascism meets a grievous end in unsuccessful war and on its ruins there is erected some more popular form of government.

In China, India and the Ukraine are what might be called large, ambitious nationalities. The Ukrainians are at present divided between several countries with the vast majority under Soviet Russia, in whose possible disruption they might conceivably take an important part. They could hardly expect to contribute anything to political theory.

Not so China and India. The present Chinese anarchy cannot be allowed the name of State, and there is no sure sign of what is to follow. But that both China and India

will eventually crystallize into one or more States of a new type I have no doubt. One might rather expect them to follow the world trend toward oligarchy which is characteristic of the so-called backward countries. I cannot follow the Russian philosopher Berdiaev in his theory that with the (undoubted) modern trend toward a situation resembling that of the Middle Ages, "the first shall be last and the last shall be first." At least, not for a considerable time. However challenged, science and efficiency are still powerful ideals. Yet it is possible that at some not too distant date, the influence of the Orient may become as decisive in political thought as it has been in religion and philosophy.

To sum up my thought:

Government of whatever existing type has, in large countries, become unstable. The political organization is no longer adequate to its technical development and human demands. Discounting the ever-present danger of overthrow from within or without, there seems to be a general groping about—a kind of uneasiness—that takes a circular form. In order to preserve its internal efficiency and external power, democracy is giving place to oligarchy. But the prerequisite of modern efficiency and power is large-scale and intelligent co-operation. This brings about an increasing claim for partici-

pation in power and material benefits, and so tends to lead back to some democratic form. It is highly significant that in the two really important despotisms, Russia and Italy, the despots have made concessions to this tendency by their plea that the existing régime is only a transitional necessity destined to usher in something new, superior and "truly democratic."

Another point. Nationalism, equality and the craving for more efficiency all tend to dwarf the individual. The result is *malaise* and a lowering of culture. It is quite conceivable that the nations may prefer power and efficiency to personal liberty and culture. But if—as I imagine—the basic trend of human development is toward greater individuation, then ever more compressed Individualism will eventually explode in some form of anarchy. The hatred of discipline, specialization and anonymity may reach a point where anything promising adventure and freedom seems preferable to further submission. Even at the beginning of the late War, this seems to have been the attitude of many, especially of factory workmen.

One might therefore reach the paradoxical conclusion that stable government of any form is in large States impossible under present conditions. And this is indeed my opinion.

The crisis may not become very acute

immediately in powerful States like Britain or the United States, but it exists and may any time show itself.[29] Such a circular shift from democracy to oligarchy and back again would, I suspect, prelude the much heralded "downfall of the Occident." The alternatives are accepting historical downfall as the inevitable fate of human institutions or voluntarily and deliberately seeking some means of harmonizing the inner demands for greater equality and personal freedom with the outer requirements of efficiency and power.

CHAPTER IV

The Alternative to Downfall

"Never hath that which men have prepared for come to pass."—*The Instruction of Ptah Hotep and of Kegemni*, translated from the Egyptian of 2500 B.C.

"The only thing we know about the future is that it will differ from the past."—Viscount Bryce, *Modern Democracies*.

Communists and cosmopolitans make light of patriotism, but most of us would desire to prevent the ruin of the nation into which we were born. To be sure, the fanatical will always sacrifice men to principles, the greedy to love of gain. In nearly everyone there is an anachronistic satisfaction in destruction. Yet the majority would certainly wish to preserve themselves, their country and their civilization from futile and violent ruin. It is on the basis of such a wish that I have here elaborated what might prove to be an alternative to the downfall that so clearly menaces present institutions.

Now the immediate causes of downfall are always the same: war and revolution. The contemporary situation is complicated by the fact that representative government—in some form the only safeguard against

successful insurrection—is breaking down owing to lack of harmony between political ideals and administrative possibilities. Nothing but conscious planning on a basis of reality offers much hope of success.

Heaven knows, there is little we can change. Human nature evolves with depressing slowness. Through what we know of history, the Will to Power is virtually constant. The Physical Frame is set so long as science does not provide new tools for modifying it. The Psychological Background seems to be part of a mysterious civilizing process with a destiny of its own—almost as though we were but actors in a set drama. Will and imagination can accomplish marvels, but we cannot choose what we will desire. Such being the case, reform is limited to external reorganization.

The task is threefold: to preserve our nations and with them Occidental civilization we must achieve a political organization that will (*a*) forestall successful insurrection within the several States; (*b*) eliminate international war; and (*c*) permit broad decentralization of government. I believe that we could do these things and that the price is simply the recognition and application to politics of scientific principles.

A government can be called scientific in which the rulers really and continuously dispose of the obvious power to make them-

selves obeyed. In their scientific possibilities lies the superiority of representative forms: not because democracy is just or Christian or reasonable, or founded on Natural Rights, is it better—in many respects it is worse; but because, as Aristotle and Pascal knew, it is the only form in which the State may be stabilized by the permanence in power of the really strong.

The conditions for scientific democracy are (1) that every one participate in politics, (2) that existing inequality of physical strength and wealth as well as strength of mind be expressed in the result, and (3) that the political unit be not too large for the technical demands of the age.

It is clear that electoral abstention falsifies the political picture, since those who do not vote could, under proper stimulus, be fired to take part in armed struggle where their force might prove decisive. Under a rational system failure to vote would be heavily penalized.

The procedure of counting heads rightly assumes that in power of bodies the citizens are approximately equal, and that inequality of wealth and mental powers comes to the front as decisively in an election as in an armed struggle. Scientific government can accept majority rule only when there has been ample opportunity for everyone freely to exert his or her powers. Let us examine these assumptions.

Under modern circumstances, no band of citizens—not even the American gangs—is so effectively armed as a properly equipped army.[30] On this account a conscripted force is politically preferable to a professional one. So long as soldiers are hired, they must be—*qua* soldiers—excluded from internal politics, since real physical equality is attained only where all the citizens are similarly armed or disarmed. Where the rulers employ the State force (army, police), in their own favour, the electoral picture is falsified.

Equally false is the electoral result where recognized and legal inequality of wealth is artificially prevented (by law or ethical feeling) from influencing the outcome. Such prevention seems nothing less than farcical when it is considered that electoral promises of tariff protection, tax adjustments, State subsidies, State contracts, personal employment, are no whit superior to direct bribing. Scientific politics demand either that power of wealth be approximately equalized, or that inequality be allowed openly to exert its influence in political life. The present age furthers, in most countries, great inequality of wealth, owing to the private ownership of natural resources, industry and banking. This leads to the common illusion that "politics are giving place to economics." Instead of which, inequality of wealth is merely seeking its appropriate political

power by methods which lip ethics and hypocritical law compel men to hide. Under such circumstances bribery becomes a virtue.

Power of minds cannot be equalized and is ultimately decisive.

Universal suffrage and representative methods, corrected by a vigilant understanding of political reality, can therefore offer an insuperable barrier to successful insurrection. Where, however, the extent of the matters to be decided is as vast as in large modern countries, the present methods of representation—a central legislative chamber more or less directly elected and with almost sovereign powers—does not provide for either intelligent planning or execution. The remedy is territorial or group decentralization (*ad hoc* bodies or Soviet " pyramiding "). Unfortunately, *salus patriae suprema lex* must be the motto of every self-respecting State, and so long as international anarchy prevails, decentralization means loss of striking power on the outside. For international anarchy implies war. Therefore effective scientific government within the single state can survive only at the price of eliminating war, which is at the same time the greatest menace to our States and our culture.

The League of Nations, the Outlawry Pact, disarmament, special referendums on war declarations, birth control—all are to some extent effective in diminishing the

chances of international hostilities. But short of the dominance of one State over all the others—the *Pax Romana*—war can be really abolished only through the formation of an International Government[31] which on the basis of International Authority, formulates international laws, establishing rights and duties and, after legal sentences by courts, imposes them with the requisite force, thus creating international justice.

This means—if you like—changing certain international war into possible civil war. But though rebellion as such requires but one rebel, group rebellion—insurrection of a serious type—can be minimized, and successful rebellion entirely prevented if the International Government be organized non-despotically on the basis of comparative force. Theoretically all existing States could be abolished and individuals vote direct for the International Assembly. Practically the voters have enough to do to select competent aldermen. Since world subdivisions are necessary and national feeling strong, the present States ought to continue in existence. Not as individuals but as States should men decide on the world's laws.

The relative strength of the several States must be truly mirrored in the Assembly of the International Super State. While a fair balance between power of bodies (numbers), power of wealth and power of minds under widely divergent conditions cannot be

exactly calculated, it can, however, be sufficiently approximated by some ratio that takes account of *population, capital wealth* and *industrial development.* For the power of mind that wins in modern warfare is very like that which builds and operates scientific mines, factories and business organizations.

To be efficient, International Authority must be restricted to those few matters of general importance which cannot be adjusted locally. This means primarily the preservation of the peace by the substitution for national violence of international law backed by adequate power. The tasks of an International State would certainly include the augmentation and effective enforcement of existing arrangements like the International Peace Pact. Probably such matters as population problems, size of "national" armaments, international communications, traffic ways, economic agreements, living standards, and even the fairer distribution of raw materials and markets would fall within its jurisdiction. In all cases the decisions of its Assembly and the interpretations of its Court would constitute law throughout the world. The fewer the laws it made, the less the chance of their being illegally challenged.

Membership in the Assembly would best be limited to what are now called Great Powers and to Alliances of smaller States; the little Powers should be compelled to enter into such an alliance in order to obtain

international representation, just as in many legislative assemblies to-day, small parties can be represented on committees only by uniting. It is entirely unnecessary that in a world whose political destinies are practically controlled by six or eight big States, every diminutive "sovereign" people should be directly represented.

The Powers and Alliances would remain "sovereign" only to the extent that they were not limited by international legislation or contracts (treaties). Furthermore they would be bound, preferably each within a particular zone, like fire stations in a modern city, to supply the executive arm (troops, war material, warships, air conveyance) at the behest of the International State to the extent necessary to preserve the latter's authority.

Such an organization is, in my eyes, the only practical guarantee against international war. With the fear of war abolished, there would no longer be vital obstacles to the institution of scientific, decentralized government within the single State. The Power or Alliance would remain the appropriate political unit of a traditional group. Patriotic feeling could still find outlet in science, sports and the International Legislature. Nationalism would quickly lose its fighting edge.

To satisfy the urge for efficiency, the Great Powers would find it convenient to

decentralize into a number of Confederate States, each of them with an area and population not larger than those of contemporary Switzerland, Wales or Massachusetts, with limited executive power. Or it might be found preferable to decentralize along occupational lines with a large number of *ad hoc* bodies. The form would not so much matter so long as the voters and legislators could keep ultimate control while being relieved of matters about which they have neither time, inclination nor capacity to inform themselves.

The jurisdiction of the Confederate State would be primarily over local administrative, cultural, social and religious matters.

Machinery and centralization make for standardized men and manufactures. Decentralization and local self-government for diversity. The present world suffers from the regimentation of minds. Radio, movies, newspaper syndicates, standardized advertising, stimulate this process, which pleases the manufacturers. But it does not make for culture. Hitherto at least, culture and large countries, or even culture and peace, have been found incompatible, since the individuation that made for culture has led to war. Already Europe, failing to carry on the chain of styles that lasted from the Middle Ages to Queen Victoria, gives signs of spiritual sterility for which the usually quoted reasons, rationalism, democracy,

machine technique, are not so much the causes as the accompaniment. Similar processes are evident in the past and lead, in last analysis, to cultural inanition and decay. To counteract this if possible, a decentralized system of administration with wide cultural and social autonomy—a mosaic of hundreds of little groups, each free from external pressure to conform, might prove highly effective. Standardized things we can, if we must, tolerate—standardized minds are a relapse of the human race into the tribe.

Only through a multiplication of groups can, in my opinion, enfranchised Individualism hope to occasion a renascence of culture.

Moreover, once the fear of war were banished, those Powers and Alliances that still preferred despotism to scientific government could be allowed to indulge their preference without opposition from the others. No Power, Alliance or Confederate State could be left free to establish such tariffs or raw stuff monopolies as it might desire. But neither should it be the aim of the International Assembly to prohibit any single form of social or economic organization which did not harm the circumambient world. Within the international agreement the right of the Power or even the Confederate State to revolution and the establishment of such laws concerning property and social usage as it saw fit should be guaranteed. All

forms of organization from dictatorship or Papal Monarchy to Quaker anarchy, from plutocracy to collectivism, could be tried and tested on a small scale. Though united against *international* law-breakers (Powers and Alliances), against epidemics, dangerous monopolistic greed and interference with communications and traffic, the earth could constitute a picture as brightly coloured and diversified as in the Middle Ages. Secure in internationalism, people could transfer their real emotion to the small group, the lesser locality, the home province, where it is most natural: even to-day most men love some city, some countryside, more deeply than the giant organization that calls itself Great Britain or the United States.

It must be remembered that, whether we organize deliberately or not, mediævalism in one form is already close upon us. Our bankers and our industrialists are busy re-weaving the group-to-group structure of the guilds and classes; our trade unions are spinning equally tight bands from nation to nation; thousands of individuals are forgetting their patriotism in a vague cosmopolitan well-being—and, most important, the needs for labour, if allowed to fulfil themselves unhampered, are creating a migratory band of workers—*Staatenlose* in the true sense, whatever their formal allegiance—who will drift from place to place, from country to country, from the

Equator to the Pole—in the exercise of their specialized talents.

It may further be expected that various bureaux, information agencies, associations of scientists and what not, will gradually take from political bodies control in specified fields, and there would seem a rare chance for functional as opposed to political representation. The result will be a skein of many coloured strings cutting like a railway system across our politically divided checkerboard. A new mediævalism may be the needed solution to the problem of how to reconcile the needs of the individual with those of mankind and the larger groups.

While we are at this business of organizing the world, it might be useful, for purely administrative reasons, to insert another slab in our pyramid—the Continental Group, with juridical and administrative authority over a vast area. To-day three such groups could be constructed: Asia with Australia, Europe with Africa, and the Two Americas. Legal cases between Powers and Alliances in the group could, in the first instance, be brought before the Continental Court, with right of appeal to the International Judges. Member Powers and Alliances would, except under quite exceptional circumstances, be required to do police duty only within the territories and waters of their respective group.

So constituted, the new organization would look something like this:

At the top, the *International State*, with legislative and juridical powers in determined matters, relying for its executive arm upon the *Great Powers and Alliances*, whose representatives would constitute the *International Assembly* on a basis of relative population, wealth and industrial development. All *Powers* and *Alliances* would be collected into *Continental Groups* for juridical and administrative purposes. The *Great Powers* would, however, like the Alliances, be composed of a great many *Confederate States*, each of which would retain enough authority to enable it to be individual.

Could world development be made to run along some such lines as those suggested here, opportunity for more fruitful activity would be given in things that really matter —ends and not means. At the least, we should have made the first deliberate attempt to preserve our States and our civilization by the elimination of war and insurrection.

Not that I have much hope that any such attempt will be made. There are still scant signs of any profound desire to stabilize the world for peace and the security of anything so anonymous as our civilization. Much more likely is a slow process of drift; large groups of opinion will go yet further in hostile directions and bring on a conflict—Capitalism *versus* Communism, Europe against America,

Asia opposing its white conquerors—that will shake technical civilization to the ground and prepare the way for something new. The result, whether world government by Capitalist dictators or by a Communist oligarchy—would last only a little time until it split asunder on its own internal despotism. Some kind of drift is the only visible alternative to deliberate reorganization on a world-wide international basis. Drift in the long run means chaos. Perhaps temporary chaos is inevitable: there is reason for suspecting that a world with no common faith beyond the value of material satisfaction has lost the cement of permanence. But that is not a political problem.

CHAPTER V

The Future of Politics

The future of politics is simply more politics. So long as the Will to Power seeks external realization, the three forces of mind, body and wealth will be at its disposal. Any modifications in mere organization that may occur, will, when scientific, make for greater stability; when unscientific, for more profuse historical incident: insurrections, wars, national ups and downs. And since the scientific quality in politics grows with the number of those participating, one might even assert that the more politics are practised, the better they will become; that half our remediable political evils are the result of abstention and indifference on the part of those educated enough to know better. Yet he who seeks to realize the kingdom of God on earth had better choose some other plot of ground, for in the light of any altruistic ideal, politics are little better than a swindle.

Each group of ambitious aspirants to power builds a wooden horse around itself, and by bribery, eloquence, flattery or fraud, persuades a sufficient number of followers to

carry the thing within some coveted Troy, which it then proceeds to conquer and despoil. Some of the new rulers take the plunder, some are satisfied with power and abstract privilege alone, and the rest—the idealists who write the programmes and win the honest votes—are left wondering how it all happened.

Yet the next time it is just the same. Not for nothing was Sinon, who duped the Trojans to their downfall, reputed the son of that Sisyphus condemned to perpetual stone- (or was it log- ?) rolling on Stygian hills.

What is history but one long series of reforms that have failed ? Even Christianity has been almost impotent to modify political practice ; the specific contribution of the Christians has been religious wars of a peculiarly harsh character. The truth was pointed out by Bryce :[32] literal Christianity and politics are incompatible. " Had Christianity been put into practice, the forms of Government would have mattered little. . . . But Christianity has never been put into practice."

The bare facts are plain to all who look. Of course the pessimists have an easy time. Listen to George Santayana on the late conflict :

" You suppose that this war has been a criminal blunder and an exceptional horror ; you imagine that before long reason will prevail and all these inferior people that

govern the world will be swept away and your own party will reform everything and remain always in office. You are mistaken. This war has given you your first glimpse of the ancient normal state of the world, your first taste of reality."[33]

So far, so good. Even the most "tender minded" must admit that what we call ethical right does not habitually triumph before our eyes. Tribes, cities, empires, republics, even churches struggle into being, are much for a time, then disappear with more or less clatter.

And none the less I must desert Santayana. For, like Machiavelli, he leaves the solid foundations of experimental fact to climb upon a pessimistic scaffolding of his own:

"It (the late war) should teach you to dismiss all your philosophies of progress or of a governing reason as the babble of dreamers who walk through one world mentally beholding another."

With all of which I disagree. There is good reason for believing that war, "normal" though it has been during the historical period, came late into human existence.[34] The elimination of war (though not of the spirit that causes it) is a practical, not a moral problem. But my real quarrel is with Santayana's denial of moral progress. I submit he can have no conclusive evidence for this belief. Recorded history covers such a brief fraction of human existence that

even apparent fixity of characteristics during this period would not preclude slow modification. In my eyes, the evidence points to moderate improvement. Human nature develops, but without violent crescendo. Which is disappointing. And nowhere more so than in politics.

Yet the cause of our disappointment is less the rate of improvement than the regularity with which we dupe ourselves as to what is. Because of our Easter Day aspirations, our lip ethics, we feel ourselves as intrinsic (and preferably misunderstood) idealists. When our ideals are not actuated by the rulers (or by ourselves in power), we grow peevish. Forgetful of that self-seeking which is our daily concern. Which of us shrank from war profiteering—if feasible and technically honest? Yet we expect our rulers to refrain from tasting the fruits of power! How many refuse attractive employment under a Government known to be corrupt? Who would really refrain from the undetectable murder of the anonymous Chinee, if thereby hung a fortune?

Theologically, we are unregenerate; all but a very fine filtering. Yet Occidental society expressly assumes our virtue and thereby turns public life to make-believe. What absurdities we talk ourselves into believing! Human equality, for instance. We cannot eliminate natural inequality. To be sure, degrees of wealth are not natural in

the sense of being inborn. Yet inequality of wealth is principally an ethical, not a political problem. Power of wealth could be speedily eliminated, if nearly everyone were not so hot on the track of the coming fortune. " Where nothing remains to be desired, there can be no cupidity," as Dante dryly commented on the world empire.

Physical and mental inequality—the unequal power of bodies and of minds—cannot be abolished. Yet the employment of physical force will stop so soon as mankind learns that nothing of permanent value can be achieved by constraint—and prefers permanent values. And mental inequality will cease to be politically operative when the chief aim of each is self-conquest. And with this event, politics will in truth " wither away."

Despite the pessimists, I feel that there is something in human beings that drives them to surpass their normal selves. Each time, to be sure, that an aspiration localizes in anything concrete like an institution or a party, it goes lame. Hence the " continuous warfare in Nature " which sincerity compels us to recognize, and the endless disappointment of promises and hopes. Yet in the end this instinctive something—being primordial—may bring about transformations that go beyond anything that now passes for a political ideal.[35]

Many thinkers are tending to consider

science an abstraction, and a descriptive abstraction at that. In particular, I feel, there can be no developed science of psychology because such a science, when complete, would be merely a duplication of the totality of experience, and convey no more and no less than its original. This experience is, as it presents itself to us, both social and individual: politics will last until these social and individual interests have completely merged. In the meantime, the efficiency of a system of government will continue to depend upon the available technique and intelligence of the rulers—provided they desire efficiency; but its righteousness will reflect their moral level. Better individuals are the only steps to better politics.

NOTES

Chapter I

[1] *Conditional Reflexes: Psychological Activity of the Cerebral Cortex*, London, 1927.

[2] *Leviathan*. This view seems to find some confirmation in the works of Sigmund Freud. See especially *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur*, 1930.

[3] Umano: *Positiva Scienza di Governo*, Turin, 1922. Translations from this work are mine. Umano is the pen name of the late Gaetano Meale, one-time judge on the Milan bench and the profoundest student of politics in modern times. I am indebted to his conversation and his books for the essentials of the views on Political Science which I uphold here.

[4] Umano: same as above.

[5] Umano: ditto.

[6] "Law in general is the sum total of those general rules of action as enforced by a sovereign authority." T. E. Holland: *Elements of Jurisprudence*.

[7] G. Lowes Dickinson: *Causes of International War*.

[8] Compare Albert Sorel: "Treaties are the expression of the relations existing at the time of their conclusion between the material and moral forces of the States which make them. According to the degree of nicety and far-sightedness with which these forces are evaluated, and the amount of attention paid by the makers to permanent rather than to accidental political conditions, such treaties are more or less lasting." My translation.

[9] *Il Principe*, III.

[10] Israel Zangwill: *Italian Fantasies.*
[11] *Pensées.*
[12] Charles Andler: *Le Pangermanisme philosophique.*
[13] *Memorie di un Sovrano deposto.*
[14] [15] G. Lowes Dickinson: same source as above.
[16] See the excellent work of Benoy Kumar Sarkar: *The Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus*, Leipzig, 1922.
[17] Vilfredo Pareto: *Trasformazione della Democrazia.*

Chapter II

[18] Pasquale Villari, in his *History of Florence*, quotes a Florentine Decree of August 6th, 1289, in which liberty is described as a natural right. Marsilius of Padua (*Defensor Pacis*, 1327) developed popular sovereignty from Christian teachings. Less well known is the "self-determination" theory as developed by the Burgundian States in their *Refusal to be Separated from the French Crown*, in which it is held to be "founded in law" that territories cannot be transferred from one sovereignty to another except with the consent of their inhabitants (1526).
[19] Quoted from Engels by H. J. Laski, in his excellent *Communism*, 1927. A damaging criticism of Communist psychology is contained in Freud: *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur.*
[20] Quoted by Laski, same work.
[21] Whether a nomad or scattered people can be called a true nation is an interesting borderline question.
[22] A most important contribution to Nationalist theory was made in 1851 by Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, with his dissertation: *Della Nazionalità come Fondamento del Diritto delle Genti.* For extravagant later developments, see the works of Charles Maurras and Enrico Corradini.

[23] The difference between the Communist and the anarchist Utopias seems in practice to be little more than that existing between a society of honey bees and one of bumble bees.

[24] In his Christmas Encyclical (1922) Pope Pius XI denied the possibility that any human institution would be able to give the nations "so good an international Code as that furnished by the Church in the Middle Ages."

[25] Raymond D. Fosdick: *The Old Savage in the New Civilization.*

[26] H. J. Laski: *Communism.*

Chapter III

[27] Lenin; quoted by Laski in *Communism.*

[28] *Antieuropa:* a "monthly review of the Roman Occident," published in Rome by a group of Fascists, is an exquisite example of the attitude of Italian Nationalism toward internationally organic tendencies. No student of Fascist Italy can afford to miss it.

[29] See Bryce, *Modern Democracies:* "If it be improbable, yet it is not unthinkable that as, in many countries, impatience with tangible evils substituted democracy for monarchy or oligarchy, a like impatience might some day reverse them." Since this sentence was written, such reversals have become almost common.

Chapter IV

[30] Where the rulers use the army for securing their own success in elections, they face the interesting problem of the influence of technical weapons as a factor in the political struggle between oligarchy and the rule of the many. In the pre-technical age, the advantage was all with the few who could afford increasingly invulnerable armour: hence the exploits of

heroes (encased in steel and mounted on steel-protected cart-horses) who slew literally thousands of (leather clothed) peasants. The use of gunpowder almost equalized matters for nearly three centuries, and successful revolutions were frequent. Contemporary technical products like airplanes, heavy artillery, poison gas and tanks, which practically only the rulers can dispose of, might once more have opened the way to rule by the few (as in Soviet Russia). Were it not for the complexity of civilization. Even in old Roman days it was none too easy to compel unwilling slaves to produce food. Under modern conditions the possibility of the strike and technical sabotage has done much toward enabling the mass of the ruled to offset the purely military superiority of the rulers.

[31] A definite occidental tradition in favour of a Super-State runs from Dante Alighieri through Henry of Navarre, Kant, Mazzini and Tennyson to Woodrow Wilson and H. G. Wells.

Chapter V

[32] *Modern Democracies.*

[33] *Soliloquies in England.*

[34] Havelock Ellis : The Origin of War : " We do not find the weapons of warfare or the wounds of warfare among these Palæolithic remains . . . it was with civilization that the art of killing developed, *i.e.*, within the last 10,000 or 12,000 years, when Neolithic men, who became our ancestors, were just arriving."

[35] The Russian Communists are seeking to hasten a somewhat similarly conceived process by constraint and education. The popular modern belief in the vast power of education to transform the individual is held in its extremest form by the American behaviourists. The cause of science could be well

served by placing a number of these professors in charge of a million or two Russian babies, with the task of producing intelligent, completely altruistic Communists. If the new generation proved equal in mental and moral qualities to its teachers the overwhelming influence of education would be reasonably demonstrated: failure would clear the air.

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